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On November 30, 2018, the US, Mexico and Canada signed an agreement that, if approved, will 
replace the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA): the United States-Mexico-Canada 
Agreement (USMCA). USMCA was negotiated under circumstances different from NAFTA. The 
US stood by its “America first” policy, among other protectionist policies. This ran counter to 
NAFTA-era neoliberal policies and previous US presidents’ efforts, since World War II, to 
establish international trade rules, arguing that they would bring stability to the world economy.1 
 
The US proposal was to let parties unilaterally decide whether or not to opt in to the investor-state 
dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism, and the US made it clear that it would not opt in. Canada’s 
preference was a more progressive ISDS mechanism akin to that of the EU-Canada 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). For Mexico, dispute-resolution 
mechanisms had an essential role; Mexico wanted to retain provisions that contribute to investment 
transactions. The end result was a limited bilateral ISDS mechanism between the US and Mexico, 
which Canada did not join. Still, under the USMCA, Canada will have access to the state-to-state 
dispute settlement, to resolve investment disputes arising out of Chapter 14.  
 
Chapter 14’s uniqueness rests on the claims covered by the bilateral (Mexico-US) ISDS 
mechanism for two distinct categories of investments. First, general investors can claim breaches 
only to national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment (only at investment’s post-establishment 
phase) and direct expropriation. Second, the “Covered Government Contracts” provisions allow 
investors that have concluded governmental contracts and related activities in oil and gas, power 
generation, public telecommunications, public transportation, and certain public infrastructure to 
claim breaches to the above three standards (even during the investment’s establishment phase) 
plus the minimum standard of treatment (including fair and equitable treatment and full protection 
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and security), transfers, performance requirements, senior management, and indirect 
expropriation. 
 
Under Covered Government Contracts, Mexico and the US allow claims to all the standard 
protections in the sectors in which treaty breaches are most frequent. In 2018, ICSID reported that 
the largest shares of claims involved investments in oil, gas and mining (24%); electric power and 
other energy (17%); construction (8%); and water, sanitation and flood protection (5%). 
Altogether, these sectors represented 54% of all cases registered under the ICSID Convention and 
Additional Facility Rules.2 The Mexican experience is similar: 40% of the investment arbitration 
cases against Mexico dealt with investments under Covered Government Contracts.3 Interestingly, 
Mexico and the US left out mining, even though, from 1999 to 2016, FDI by US investors in 
Mexican mining amounted to US$6.8 billion.4 Instead, they preferred to cover energy and 
telecommunications, where US investors channeled, respectively, US$4.6 and US$5.9 billion. 
 
Conversely, the US and Mexico decided, through the general investment section, to allow narrower 
enforcement of protections to the largest FDI flows from the US to Mexico. Between 1999 and 
2016, manufacturing accounted for 49% of US FDI inflows.  
 
In the current investment arbitration crisis, USMCA presents a new gold standard to enforce 
investment protection. First, under general investment, USMCA reduces states’ risk exposure by 
precluding investors’ access to ISDS for claims of alleged breaches to indirect expropriation and 
fair and equitable treatment standards, and national treatment and most-favored-nation standards 
at the investment’s pre-establishment phase. Governments concerned with regulatory chill and the 
exercise of police powers should adopt the USMCA model, as it reduces the risk of ISDS claims 
related to the regulation of health, national security,5 morals, and the environment. Philip Morris, 
which questioned the “plain packaging” and “single presentation” policies adopted by Australia 
and Uruguay, would have had no grounds to advance a claim under USMCA. Also, with the 
Covered Government Contracts, governments will continue protecting the most sensitive sectors 
in which ISDS cases frequently arise.  
 
A government willing to adopt the USMCA model should identify the sectors that, based on the 
relevance of investment flows and frequency of investment-treaty breaches, require the broadest 
protection, ponder the risks associated with these sectors and opt to protect the latter by bearing 
these risks. For instance, Colombia’s highest 2018 inward FDI shares were in oil, financial services 
and mining. It should consider protecting the oil and mining sectors under Covered Government 
Contracts, and subject other industries (such as financial services, agriculture, manufacturing, and 
construction) to the general investments.6 Governments should not fear that this results in lower 
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